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ABSTRACT
In Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MA-RL), independent co-
operative learners must overcome a number of pathologies to learn
optimal joint policies. Addressing one pathology often leaves ap-
proaches vulnerable towards others. For instance, hysteretic Q-
learning [15] addresses miscoordination while leaving agents vul-
nerable towards misleading stochastic rewards. Other methods,
such as leniency, have proven more robust when dealing with mul-
tiple pathologies simultaneously [28]. However, leniency has pre-
dominately been studied within the context of strategic form games
(bimatrix games) and fully observable Markov games consisting
of a small number of probabilistic state transitions. This raises the
question of whether these findings scale to more complex domains.
For this purpose we implement a temporally extend version of
the Climb Game [3], within which agents must overcome multiple
pathologies simultaneously, including relative overgeneralisation,
stochasticity, the alter-exploration and moving target problems,
while learning from a large observation space. We find that ex-
isting lenient and hysteretic approaches fail to consistently learn
near optimal joint-policies in this environment. To address these
pathologies we introduce Negative Update Intervals-DDQN (NUI-
DDQN), a Deep MA-RL algorithm which discards episodes yielding
cumulative rewards outside the range of expanding intervals. NUI-
DDQN consistently gravitates towards optimal joint-policies in our
environment, overcoming the outlined pathologies.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MA-RL) literature pro-
vides a rich taxonomy of learning pathologies that cooperative
Independent Learners (ILs) must overcome to converge upon an op-
timal joint-policy, e.g. stochasticity, the alter-exploration andmoving
target problems [16]. While searching for an optimal joint-policy,
the actions of ILs influence each others’ search space. This can lead
to action shadowing, where miscoordination due to sub-optimal
joint-policies results in utility values of optimal actions being un-
derestimated [5, 20]. In this paper we address the above pathologies
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Montreal, Canada. © 2019 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and
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and a type of action shadowing called relative overgeneralisation.
This pathology can occur when pairing an IL’s available actions
with arbitrary actions by the other agents results in a sub-optimal
action having the highest utility estimate [28]. As a result, ILs can
be drawn to sub-optimal but wide peaks in the reward search space
due to a greater likelihood of achieving collaboration there [20].
Numerous methods have been proposed in MA-RL literature to
help ILs cope with the outlined pathologies. Traditionally meth-
ods have been studied within the context of bimatrix games and
fully observable Markov games consisting of a small number of
probabilistic state transitions. However, finding robust solutions
that perform consistently is challenging, even in traditional set-
tings, as solutions to one pathology often leave agents vulnerable
towards others [28]. For approaches that perform consistently, ques-
tions remain regarding scalability, i.e., can they overcome the same
pathologies in complex domains that suffer from the curse of di-
mensionality and require reasoning over long time horizons? To
answer this question we evaluate the ability of leniency and hys-
teretic Q-Learning, two decentralized approaches with a strong track
record in traditional settings, to overcome the pathologies outlined
in a temporally extended, partially observable version of the Climb
Game [3]. We call this game the Apprentice Firemen Game (AFG).
Hysteretic Q-Learning is a form of optimistic learning that helps
agents overcome miscoordination [15]. However, this approach
can leave agents vulnerable towards misleading stochastic rewards
[19, 28]. Lenient learners meanwhile are initially forgiving towards
teammates, often ignoring state transitions that would lower a
utility value [20]. However, the more often an observation-action
pair is encountered, the less likely lenient learners are to be for-
giving. Therefore leniency is less vulnerable towards misleading
stochastic rewards [28]. Both approaches have been extended to
Deep MA-RL (MA-DRL) [18, 19]. To date the majority of MA-DRL
research focuses on stochasticity and mitigating an amplified mov-
ing target problem resulting from obsolete state transitions being
stored inside Experience Replay Memories (ERM) [4, 18, 19, 30]. The
AFG meanwhile allows us to study the robustness of MA-DRL al-
gorithms simultaneously facing all of the above pathologies in a
system suffering from the curse of dimensionality.
Within the AFG agents must make an irrevocable decision that
will determine the outcome of an episode. We find that while hys-
teretic and lenient learners deliver promising performances in lay-
outs where agents can observe each other’s irrevocable decision,
both algorithms converge upon sub-optimal joint policies when the
same irrevocable decision is made in seclusion. To help ILs overcome
the outlined pathologies in this challenging setting, we introduce
a novel approach where agents maintain expanding intervals es-
timating themin andmax of cumulative reward distributions for
state-transition trajectories ending without miscoordination. The
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intervals determine which trajectories are stored and used for sam-
pling, allowing ILs to discard trajectories resulting in miscoordina-
tion. This reduces the impact of noisy utility values occurring in co-
operative games with high punishment for uncoordinated behavior,
increasing the likelihood of average utility values being established
for sequences of actions leading to coordinated outcomes. We call
this approach NUI-DDQN (Negative Update Intervals Double-DQN ).
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows.
1) We design a new environment that simultaneously confronts
ILs with all four of the mentioned pathologies. The environment is
based on the Climb Game, which has been used to study relative
overgeneralisation and stochastic rewards. We embed the Climb
Game in a temporally-extended gridworld setting, that we call the
Apprentice Firemen Game (AFG), in which two fireman need to
coordinate to extinguish a fire. Stochastic transitions can be added
through introducing randomlymoving civilians who obstruct paths.
2)We empirically evaluate hysteretic and lenient approaches in two
AFG layouts (Figure 2). Layout 1 examines whether the pathologies
can be overcome when ILs can observe each other while making
an irrevocable choice that determines the outcome of an episode.
In contrast layout 2 requires ILs to independently make the same
irrevocable decision in seclusion. We find that ILs predominately con-
verge upon superior joint-policies in layout 1, providing evidence
that ILs can implicitly learn to avoid miscoordination when able to
observe each other during transitions that determine an episode’s
outcome. Layout 2 poses a challenge for existing approaches. Le-
nient learners in particular face the following dilemma: remain
lenient and be led astray by misleading stochastic rewards, or esti-
mate average utility values and succumb to relative overgeneralisa-
tion due oscillating utility values caused by stochastic transitions.
3)We introduce NUI-DDQN, a MA-DRL algorithm which discards
episodes yielding cumulative rewards outside the range of expand-
ing intervals. These intervals are maintained for sequences of tran-
sitions (trajectories) equivalent to actions from cooperative games.
NUI-DDQN reduces the noise introduced by punishing values re-
sulting from miscoordination to utility estimates, allowing ILs to
overcome relative overgeneralisation and the alter-exploration prob-
lem. NUI-DDQN consistently converges upon the optimal joint-
policy in both layouts for deterministic and stochastic rewards.
2 DEFINITIONS AND NOTATIONS
Below is a summary of the definitions used in this paper. Although
many of the concepts discussed are from game theory we shall
use the terms agent and player interchangeably. Furthermore, to
prevent confusion we refer to actions taken in strategic-form games
as u ∈ U while actions in Markov games are denoted as a ∈ A.
Strategic-Form Games. A strategic-form game is defined as a
tuple (n,U1...n ,R1...n ) where n represents the number of agents,
U1...n the joint action space (U1 × ... × Un ), with Ui being the
set of actions available to agent i , and Ri is the reward function
Ri : U1 × ... ×Un → R for each agent i [1]. In this paper, we focus
on strategic-form games with n = 2, commonly known as bimatrix
games. We note that in strategic-form games players make their
choices simultaneously.
Stochastic rewards. Normally in a strategic-form game, all re-
wards are deterministic (DET). Given that stochasticity (of both
rewards and transitions) are a central pathology of MA-RL, in this
paper we also consider both partially stochastic (PS) and fully sto-
chastic (FS) rewards. DET and FS reward functions exclusively
return deterministic and stochastic rewards respectively for each
U1...n . Meanwhile for a PS reward function there exists up to |U | −1
joint actionsU1...n for which a stochastic reward is returned, while
the remaining joint actions return deterministic rewards [28].
MarkovGames. In contrast to strategic-form gameswhere choices
are made simultaneously, in a Markov game players make their
choices sequentially. The game transitions from state to state, with
choices and corresponding rewards collected along the way. For-
mally, a Markov gameM has a finite state space X , an observation
function Oi : X → Rd which returns a d-dimensional observation
for agent i , for each state x ∈ X a joint action space (A1 × ... ×An ),
withAi being the number of actions available to agent i , a transition
function T : X ×A1 × ... ×An × X ′ → [0, 1], returning the proba-
bility of transitioning from a state x to x ′ given an action profile
a1 × ... × an , and a reward function: Ri : X ×A1 × ... ×An → R for
each agent i [11, 24]. We allow terminal states at which the game
ends. Note that a strategic-form game can be thought of a Markov
game with a single terminal state.
Policies. For agent i , the policy πi represents a mapping from
the observation space to a probability distribution over actions:
πi : Oi → ∆(Ai ), while π refers to a joint policy of all agents.
Joint policies excluding agent i are defined as π−i . The notation
⟨πi ,π−i ⟩ refers to a joint policy with agent i following πi while the
remaining agents follow π−i .
Trajectories. We call a particular roll-out of a policy πi , i.e., the
sequence of resulting states, actions, and associated rewards, a
trajectory and denote it by τi [26].
Expected Gain. Given a joint policy π the gain (or expected sum
of future rewards) for each agent i starting from a state x is defined
in Equation 1 below, where ri,t refers to the reward received by
agent i at time-step t , while γ ∈ [0, 1) is a discount factor [16]:
Ui,π (x) = Eπ
{ ∞∑
k=0
γkri,t+k+1 |xt = x
}
. (1)
Nash Equilibrium. For a Markov game, a joint policy π∗ is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if no agent i can improve it’s gain through
unilaterally deviating from π∗ [16]:
∀i,∀πi ∈ ∆(X ,Ai ),∀x ∈ X ,Ui, ⟨π ∗i ,π ∗−i ⟩(x) ≥ Ui, ⟨πi ,π ∗−i ⟩(x). (2)
Pareto Optimality. From a group perspective Nash equilibria are
often sub-optimal. In contrast Pareto-optimality defines a joint
policy πˆ from which no agent i can deviate without making at
least one other agent worse off. A joint policy π is therefore Pareto-
dominated by πˆ iff [16]:
∀i,∀x ∈ X ,Ui, πˆ (x) ≥ Ui,π (x) and ∃j,∃x ∈ X ,Uj, πˆ (x) ≥ Uj,π (x). (3)
ParetoDominatedNashEquilibrium.A joint policy πˆ∗ is Pareto
optimal if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other π [16].
Team Games. A game, be it a strategic-form or Markov game, is a
team game if every player gets the same reward, i.e., R1 = R2 = R.
Thus, team games are fully cooperative settings, where players have
a shared objective to maximize their common return (see Figure 1)
[2, 3, 16]. In the rest of the paper, we only consider team games.
3 TEMPORALLY-EXTENDED TEAM GAMES
We conduct empirical evaluations in temporally-extended versions
of team bimatrix games (TEGs). The outcome of these games is
determined by joint-trajectories τ resulting from π . The reward
function has inequalities mirroring those of the corresponding
bimatrix game. Therefore, each τi belongs to a set of trajectoriesTu
that implements an actionu ∈ U . ILs are taskedwith learning a joint
policy π that results in optimal joint trajectories τ . Throughout this
paper τi refers to a trajectory that consists of all the state-transition
tuples (ot−1,at−1, rt ,ot ) of an individual episode. In Section 7, we
introduce a temporally-extended version of the Climb Game, which
serves as the basis for our experiments.
4 PATHOLOGIES IN MA-RL
In this section, we elaborate on the pathologies outlined in the
introduction. As mentioned, addressing one pathology often leaves
agents vulnerable towards others. We discuss this in detail, while
considering the implications of tackling these pathologies in com-
plex environments. To understand the pathologies, we consider two
types of ILs attempting to estimate the quality of an action u when
paired with the actionsU ′ available to the other agent [28]:
• Average based learners estimate the quality of u based on the
average return: quality(u) = ∑u′∈U ′ Ri (u,u ′)/|U ′ |.
• Maximum based learners estimate the quality of u based on the
maximum return observed: quality(u) = maxu′∈U ′ Ri (u,u ′).
We now discuss the four pathologies: relative overgeneralisation,
stochasticity, the alter-exploration, and moving target problems.
4.1 Relative Overgeneralisation
Relative overgeneralisation is a type of Action Shadowing, occurring
in games where a sub-optimal Nash Equilibrium yields a higher
payoff on average when each selected action is paired with an
arbitrary action chosen by the other player [28]. A shadowed equi-
librium is an equilibrium defined by a policy π that is shadowed by
a policy πˆ in a state x , where at least one agent exists who when
unilaterally deviating from π , will receive a gainU ⟨πi ,π −i ⟩(x) less
than the minimum gain that can be obtained for deviating from
πˆ (Equation 4) [16]. Relative overgeneralisation occurs in games
where, as a result of a shadowed equilibrium, the agents converge
upon a sub-optimal Nash Equilibrium that is Pareto-dominated by
at least one other Nash Equilibrium [14, 16, 28].
∃i∃πiU⟨πi ,π−i ⟩(x) < minj,πj U⟨πj , πˆ−j ⟩(x). (4)
Example: Variations of the Climb Game [3] (Figure 1) are fre-
quently used to study the susceptibility of ILs towards relative
overgeneralisation. In the Climb Game the Pareto-Optimal Nash
Equilibrium is (A,A). However, assuming two ILs initially choose
each of the actions available with equal probability, using an average
based algorithm, then Agent 1 will estimate that C should be pre-
ferred over A and B, since
∑(A, j) < ∑(C, j) and ∑(B, j) < ∑(C, j)
for each of Agent 2’s actions j [28]. Agent 2 will come to the same
conclusion, resulting in the agents gravitating towards the shadow
equilibrium (C,C). If an alternative action is still being played with
a small probability, then Agent 1 will move from action C to B.
Subsequently Agent 2 will also climb from C to B. At this point the
agents will climb no further, having reached a Pareto dominated
sub-optimal Nash equilibrium (B,B).
4.2 Stochasticity of rewards and transitions
In the deterministic reward Climb Game (Figure 1a) relative overgen-
eralisation can be overcome with maximum-based learning, where
agents consider each action i based on the observedmax j (i, j) [28].
However, this approach leaves agents vulnerable towards mislead-
ing stochastic rewards. For example, in the Partially Stochastic Climb
Game (Figure 1b) the joint action (B,B) yields stochastic rewards
of 14 and 0 with 50% probability. Therefore maximum based learn-
ers are drawn towards (B,B), despite each agent only receiving a
reward of 7 on average. In temporally extended games additional
stochasticity can emerge as a result of environmental factors such
as noisy observations and probabilistic state transitions. Meanwhile,
ILs facing the curse of dimensionality must overcome challenges
introduced by noisy approximated utility estimates backed-up from
stochastic follow-on state-transitions or rewards [16].
Player 2
A B C
Pl
ay
er
1 A (11, 11) (−30,−30) (0, 0)
B (−30,−30) (7, 7) (6, 6)
C (0, 0) (0, 0) (5, 5)
(a) Deterministic
Player 2
A B C
Pl
ay
er
1 A (11, 11) (−30,−30) (0, 0)
B (−30,−30) (14/0, 14/0) (6, 6)
C (0, 0) (0, 0) (5, 5)
(b) Partially Stochastic.
Figure 1: Climb Games Variations. For (b) joint-action (B, B) yields
stochastic rewards of 14 and 0 with 50% probability
4.3 The alter-exploration problem
The exploration-exploitation trade-off required by reinforcement
learners adds to the challenge of learning noise-free utility estimates.
Matignon et al. [16] define global exploration, the probability of
at least one of n agents exploring as 1 − (1 − ϵ)n , where each
agent explores according to a probability ϵ . In environments with
a shadowed equilibrium, as defined in Section 4.1, higher global
exploration can result in agents converging upon a sub-optimal
joint policy, as exploration can lead to penalties [16]. Furthermore,
we consider that in TEGs agents face two types of alter-exploration:
1.) Exploring at an atomic level. Due to global exploration short
sequences of actions may be sub-optimal, e.g., collisions with other
agents, sub-optimal paths, etc, thereby introducing noise when the
agents compute utility value estimates.
2.) Exploring at a trajectory level.Global exploration can impact
the set of trajectories Tu that trajectory τi belongs to for an agent
i , and therefore the outcome of an episode. We therefore argue that
for MA-DRL algorithms to overcome the alter-exploration problem
considerations are required at both levels.
4.4 The moving target problem
When multiple ILs update policies in parallel an environment can
no longer be considered Markovian, thereby losing the property
that guarantees convergence for a large number of single-agent
learning algorithms [1, 25]. This problem is amplified in MA-DRL,
where using ERMs often results in deprecated transitions being
sampled during training [4, 18, 19]. Furthermore, as we shall discuss
in section 8.5, stochastic transitions can lead to the moving target
problem, which can result in long periods of miscoordination.
5 INDEPENDENT LEARNER BASELINES
The algorithms evaluated are extensions of theDouble-DQN (DDQN)
introduced by Van Hasselt et al. [27]. Each agent i is implemented
with a ConvNet trained to approximate Q-Values for observation-
action pairs: Qi : Oi × Ai → R [11]. The network parameters θ
are trained using Adam [10] on the mean squared Bellman residual
with the expectation taken over state transitions uniformly sampled
from an ERM based on a probability distribution p (o,a) [12, 17],
Li (θi ) = Eo,a∼p(·)
[
(Yt −Q (o,a;θt ))2
]
, (5)
where Yt is the target:
Yt ≡ rt+1 + γQ(ot+1, argmax
a∈A
Q(ot+1,a;θt );θ ′t ). (6)
The set of parameters θ ′t in Equation 6 belong to amore stable tar-
get network, which is synchronisedwith the current network everyn
transitions [27]. Each IL agent i is implementedwith a separate ERM
used to store state transitions as tuples (oi,t−1,ai,t−1, ri,t ,oi,t ), con-
sisting of an observation oi,t−1, action ai,t−1, the resulting obser-
vation oi,t and the immediate reward ri,t . To ensure obsolete tran-
sitions are eventually discarded ERMs are implemented as First-In
First-Out (FIFO) queues [11].
5.1 Hysteretic Q-Learning
Hysteretic Q-Learning is an optimistic MA-RL algorithm originally
introduced to address maximum based learner’s vulnerability to-
wards stochasticity by using two learning rates α and β , where
β < α [28]. Given a TD-Error δ , where δ = Yt − Q (ot ,at ;θt ), a
hysteretic Q-value update is performed as described in Equation 7,
where β reduces the impact of negative Q-Value updates while
learning rate α is used for positive updates [15]. However, hysteretic
Q-Learners still have a tendency to gravitate towards sub-optimal
policies when receiving misleading stochastic rewards [19, 28].
Q (xt ,at ) =
{
Q (xt ,at ) + αδ if δ > 0.
Q (xt ,at ) + βδ Otherwise.
(7)
5.2 Leniency
Lenient learners have proven robust towards stochastic rewards
by initially forgiving (ignoring) sub-optimal actions by teammates,
while over time applying an average based approach for frequently
visited observation-action pairs [19–21, 28, 30]. The frequency with
which negative updates are performed is determined by Equation 8
and a random variable χ ∼ U (0, 1), with negative updates only tak-
ing place if χ > l(oi ,ai ) (Equation 9). Constant K is a leniency mod-
eration factor determining how the temperature value affects the
drop-off in lenience [28]. The temperature Tt (oi ,ai ) is decayed each
time an (oi ,ai ) pair is encountered. Meanwhile, Lenient-DDQNs
(LDDQNs) store the leniency value computed at time t inside the
ERM, subsequently determining the frequency with which the cor-
responding transition can induce negative updates [19].
l(oi ,ai ) = 1 − e−K∗Tt (oi ,ai ). (8)
Q (ot ,at ) =
{
Q (ot ,at ) + αδ if δ > 0 or χ > l (ot ,at ).
Q (ot ,at ) if δ ≤ 0 and χ ≤ l (ot ,at ).
(9)
6 NEGATIVE UPDATE INTERVALS INMA-DRL
Our aim is to compute intervals for each action u ∈ U , where
the lower endpoint is approximately themin reward received for
coordinated behaviour involving u. Therefore, receiving a reward
less thanmin on the interval indicatesmiscoordination has occurred.
Below we define negative update intervals and describe how they
help NUI-DDQN overcome relative overgeneralisation in TEGs.
Negative Updates.We define negative updates as Q-value updates
using a TD-Error δ < 0. In Equations 7 and 9 both leniency and hys-
teretic Q-learning reduce the impact of updates that would result in
the lowering of Q-Values. However, neither algorithm distinguishes
lowering Q-Values due to stochastic rewards from lowering based
on miscoordination. Maximum based learners meanwhile avoid
negative updates altogether by maintaining utility values for each
action u ∈ U based on the highest observed reward rmaxu .
Negative Update Intervals.While agents guided by rmaxu are vul-
nerable towards stochastic rewards, we consider that for PS and FS
reward spaces where rminu for coordinated outcomes is greater than
the punishment received for miscoordination, there exists intervals
[rminu , rmaxu ] within which negative updates to utility estimates
can be performed while mitigating the noise induced through pun-
ishment for miscoordination. We show that maintaining negative
update intervals for each action u ∈ U increases the likelihood of
agents within TEGs converging upon an optimal joint policy πˆ∗.
Classifying Trajectories. Joint-trajectories τ determine the re-
wards yielded by TEGs. Therefore, given an oracle ϑ : T → U
capable of determining the set Tu that trajectory τ belongs to, neg-
ative update intervals [rminu , rmaxu ] can be stored for each action
u ∈ U , thereby increasing the likelihood of ILs computing noise
free average utility values for transitions belonging to coordinated
joint-trajectories τ . For simplicity our evaluations use TEGs with a
predefinedU . However, under Future Work (Section 10) we discuss
the potential of using a theory of mind neural network [22] for ϑ .
Maintaining Negative Update Intervals.We establish rmaxu for
each action u during an initial exploration phase used to fill the
ERMs. Initially rminu = rmaxu . During training rminu is gradually
decayed. To prevent a premature decay during phases where ILs
are confronted with the alter-exploration problem, we only only
decay if the cumulative reward for the trajectory (Rτ =
∑ |τ |
t=0 rt )
is large enough. That is, rminu is only decayed if Rτ ≥ rmaxu − ε ,
where ε is a small constant.
Addressing Catastrophic Forgetting. Catastrophic forgetting
occurs when trained networks forget how to perform previously
learned tasks while learning to master a new task [6]. To allow
agents to maintain Q-Values for transitions belonging to less fre-
quently observed actionsu, without preventing outdated transitions
from being discarded, we implement a separate ERM for each action
u ∈ U . Instead of storing n transitions each ERMu stores n episodes,
since traditional ERMs may store a significant number of obsolete
transitions once ILs become efficient at solving a task and require
less steps. Episodic ERMs meanwhile are more likely to reflect the
current search space. During sampling the ERMu are concatenated.
Storing Trajectories. In addition to rminu we maintain vectors Ru ,
which store the most recent n cumulative rewards for each action u.
A trajectory is stored iff the cumulative reward Rτ is greater than
the max between rminu and the Ru ’s mean Ru minus the standard
deviation SDRu (Equation 10). Therefore, while leniency is vulner-
able towards miscoordination upon cooling temperature values,
NUI-DDQN will continue to discard miscoordination trajectories.
ERMu =
{
ERMu ∪ τ if Rτ ≥ max(rminu ,Ru − SDRu ).
ERMu Otherwise.
(10)
7 THE APPRENTICE FIREMEN GAME (AFG)
The Climb Game is often studied as a repeated game. We are inter-
ested in solving an equivalent game extended over the temporal
dimension, where joint trajectories τ result in outcomes compara-
ble to the joint-actions from Figure 1. We formulate a TEG based on
the Climb Game that we call the Apprentice Firemen Game (AFG),
where two (or more) agents located within a gridworld are tasked
with locating and extinguishing fires. First however the agents must
locate an equipment pickup area and choose one of the items listed
in Table 1 below. The task is fully cooperative, i.e. both agents are
required to extinguish one fire. As outlined in Table 1 both agents
detonating an explosive device (fighting fire with fire) is the most
effective combination, equivalent to the joint action (A,A) in the
Climb Game. While the fire extinguisher is more effective than the
fire blanket, agents choosing one run the risk of being hit by debris
if the other agent triggers an explosive device, whereas the fire
blanket offers protection. Therefore the fire extinguisher and fire
blanket are equivalent to actions B and C respectively.
Description Action (u ∈ U ) Effectiveness Risk
Explosive Device A High High
Fire Extinguisher B Medium High
Fire Blanket C Weak None
Table 1: Apprentice Firemen Game Equipment
ILs are not explicitly told which actions other agents have per-
formed [28]. However, we hypothesize ILs can learn to avoid mis-
coordination in the AFG when able to observe each other during
transitions that determine an episode’s outcome, reducing the im-
pact of optimal joint action (A,A) being a shadowed equilibrium. To
test this hypothesis we conduct experiments using two layouts out-
lined below (and illustrated in Figure 2), where equipment pickup
decisions are irrevocable for the duration of each episode. At the
start of an episode one randomly chosen obstacle in the main area
is set on fire. Episodes end when both agents occupy cells next to
the fire, upon which a terminal reward is returned. To eliminate
confounding factors all non-terminal transitions yield a reward of 0.
We introduce a 10,000 step limit upon observing that trained agents
delay miscoordination outcomes through avoiding the fire. The
agents receive a miscoordination reward of -1.0 upon reaching this
limit. The action space is discrete and includes moving up, down,
left, right and NOOP. Pickup actions occur automatically upon
ILs entering an equipment cell empty handed. DDQNs perform
well when receiving rewards within [−1, 1], which led us to choose
the reward structures listed in Figure 3. For stochastic transitions
randomly moving civilians can be added who obstruct paths.
Layout 1: Observable irrevocable decisions Two agents in a
16 × 15 gridworld begin each episode in opposite corners of a
compartment separated from the main area. The agents must exit
Algorithm 1 NUI-DDQN
1: Input: Number of episodes E, replay period K , max steps T
2: Random exploration phase (Init for ERMu , rminu and rmaxu )
3: for e = 1 to E do
4: τ = ∅
5: Observe o0 and choose a0 ∼ πθ (o0)
6: for t = 1 to T do
7: Observe ot , rt
8: Store transition (ot−1, at−1, rt , ot ) in τ
9: if t ≡ 0 mod K then
10: Optimise Network
11: end if
12: Copy weights from time to time: θ ′t ← θt
13: Choose at ∼ πθ (ot )
14: end for
15: u ← ϑ (τ )
16: Ru ← Ru ∪ Rτ
17: if rmaxu < Rτ then
18: rmaxu ← Rτ
19: end if
20: if Rτ ≥ max(rminu ,Ru − SDRu ) then
21: ERMu ← ERMu ∪ τ
22: end if
23: if Rτ ≥ rmaxu − ε then
24: rminu ← decay(rminu )
25: end if
26: end for
the compartment, gather equipment from a shared pickup area and
subsequently extinguish the fire, meaning that agents observe each
other during the irrevocable equipment selection process. One agent
can therefore observe the other agent’s choice and subsequently
select a best response to avoid miscoordination - in terms of the
original Climb (bimatrix) game, this allows agents to act as if it
was a perfect-information commitment version of the game with a
follower and leader.
Layout 2: Irrevocable decisions in seclusion Two agents in a
padded 53 × 53 gridworld begin each episode in separate chambers.
To mimic the simultaneity of the choice of actions in the Climb (bi-
matrix) game, each agent is limited to 13×13 centered observations.
Agents are therefore unable to observe each others’ equipment
selection actions.
(a) Layout 1 (b) Layout 2
Figure 2: AFG layouts with fires (yellow), obstacles (grey) and
equipment A (red), B (green) & C (blue). Firemen are initially
white, but following a pickup adopt the equipment’s color.
Deterministic (DET) Partially Stochastic (PS) Fully Stochastic (FS)
Action A B C A B C A B C
A (.8, .8) (−1.,−1.) (0, 0) (.8, .8) (−1.,−1.) (0, 0) (.9/.7, .9/.7) (.2/−1, .2/−1) (.6/−.6, .6/−.6)
B (−1.,−1.) (.6, .6) (.5, .5) (−1.,−1.) (1.0/0, 1.0/0)* (.5, .5) (.2/−1, .2/−1) (1.0/0, 1.0/0)* (.9/.1, .9/.1)
C (.0, .0) (.0, .0) (.4, .4) (.0, .0) (.0, .0) (.4, .4) (.6/−.6, .6/−.6) (.4/−.4, .4/−.4) (.8/0, .8/0)
Figure 3: Reward structures for Deterministic (DET), Partially Stochastic (PS) and Fully Stochastic (FS) Apprentice Firemen Games, to be
interpreted as rewards for (Agent 1, Agent 2). For (B,B)* within PS and FS 1.0 is yielded on 60% of occasions.
8 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
8.1 MA-DRL implementation details
Given the number of cells within the main area that agents can
occupy (90), fire locations (25), agent color combinations (16) and
actions (5) we estimate 16,020,000 state-action pairs per layout
before factoring in civilians and additional layout specific cells. We
therefore follow the example of recent publications by conducting
evaluations in gridworlds with sufficient complexity to warrant a
MA-DRL approach [7, 11, 19]. Networks consist of 2 convolutional
layers with 32 and 64 kernels respectively, a fully connected layer
(1024 neurons) and an output node for each action1. We use learning
rate α = 0.0001, discount rate γ = 0.95 and ϵ-Greedy exploration
with a ϵ decay rate of 0.999. Each ERM stores 250,000 transitions.
Regarding algorithm specific configurations:
NUI-DDQN. To determine the set of trajectories that τ belongs to
each oracle ϑ queries the respective agent instance regarding the
ID of the equipment used. Each ERMu stores 100 episodes, while
the decay rate for rminu is set to 0.995.
LDDQNs. We use a leniency moderation factor K = 1.0 and a
retroactive temperature decay schedule combined with temperature
greedy exploration strategy as described in [19].
HDDQNs. In our evaluation below β is the decimal portion of α .
8.2 Experiments
To evaluate our hypothesis in Section 7 we collect 30 training runs
of 5,000 episodes per algorithm within each layout. For LDDQNs
an additional 5,000 episodes are required to sufficiently decay the
temperatures T(oi ,ai ). Finally, to evaluate the impact of stochastic
transitions we introduce 10 civilians in layout 2 and conduct 30
runs of 10,000 episodes per setting.
8.3 Evaluation using phase plots
The ternary phase plots depicted in Table 2 provide insights regard-
ing the learning dynamics of the agents. Each line illustrates the
average shift in the trajectory distributions throughout the runs
conducted, using a rolling window of 1000 episodes. The black
squares at the centre of each plot represent the averaged initial Tu
distributions while the red dots represents the final distribution.
Each corner represents 100% of trajectories τ ∈ Tu for the labelled
action u ∈ U . For example, if both lines end with red dots in the
top corner of a simplex, then the two agents are predominately
producing trajectories τ ∈ TA, and have converged upon the op-
timal Nash Equilibrium (A,A). The agents have therefore learned
policies where the optimal equipment is being selected from the
pickup area in the AFG, as outlined in section 7.
1We make our code available online: https://github.com/gjp1203/nui_in_madrl
Determistic rewards. Under pathologies (Section 4) we discuss
how maximum based learners can overcome relative overgenerali-
sation in the deterministic reward Climb Game. Similarly the phase
plots for deterministic reward settings confirm that with sufficient
optimism / leniency, ILs can overcome relative overgeneralisation
while facing the curse of dimensionality (HDDQN β = 0.5, LD-
DQN and NUI-DDQN in Table 2). Meanwhile, HDDQN (β = 0.9)
shows that agents with insufficient optimism gravitate towards
the shadow equilibrium (C,C). Interestingly in layout 2 with 10
civilians HDDQN (β = 0.9) agents are completing the climb steps
discussed in Section 4.1 towards (B,B), while β = {0.5, 0.7} con-
verge towards superior joint policies compared to layout 2 without
civilians. Further investigation is required to establish why.
Stochastic Rewards. As evident by the phase plots in Table 2 the
optimism that helps HDDQNs overcome relative overgeneralisation
in the deterministic reward settings can lead agents to converge
upon sub-optimal joint policies when learning from PS or FS re-
wards. For HDDQN (β = 0.5) for instance we observe an increase
in τ ∈ T B for PS, and τ ∈ TC by agent 2 for FS rewards. LD-
DQNs meanwhile are less vulnerable, gravitating towards optimal
joint-policies despite stochastic rewards and relative overgener-
alisation in layout 1 and when receiving PS rewards in layout 2
with no civilians. However, LDDQNs struggle when receiving FS
rewards in layout 2, and have limited success once civilians are
added. NUI-DDQNs meanwhile predominately converge upon op-
timal joint-policies. When receiving PS rewards NUI-DDQNs are
initially tempted by the misleading rewards received for (B,B), be-
fore converging on a joint-policy with the majority of trajectories
τ ∈ TA. For FS rewards a slight increase in τ ∈ TC can be observed.
8.4 Learning best response policies
In Section 7 we proposed that ILs should learn to avoid miscoordina-
tion trajectories within layout 1 due to observing each other during
interactions with the equipment pick-up area. To compare the poli-
cies learned in layouts 1 and 2 (without civilians), we compute the
average coordinated rewards RC for each training run. We compute
RC using the rewards from the final 1000 episodes that did not end
in miscoordination outcomes {(A,B), (B,A)}. Runs with RC ≈ 0.8
have converged upon the optimal joint-policy, where (A,A) is the
most frequently observed outcome. For the majority of settings
higher RC values are achieved by agents in layout 1. The scatter
plots in Table 3 provide evidence to support our hypothesis. Each
marker within the scatter plots represents the RC for an individual
run. To provide further clarity we sort the runs by RC . We observe
that HDDQN β = 0.7 and β = 0.9 converges upon a policy with
RC ≈ 0.8 numerous times in each reward setting in layout 1, while
Layout 1 (Civilians: 0, Episodes: 5,000) Layout 2 (Civilians: 0, Episodes: 5,000) Layout 2 (Civilians: 10, Episodes: 10,000)
DET PS FS DET PS FS DET PS FS
Hysteretic-DDQN β=0.5
Hysteretic-DDQN β=0.7
Hysteretic-DDQN β=0.9
Lenient-DDQN
NUI-DDQN
Table 2: Phase plots illustrating the average shift in the action u distributions throughout the runs conducted, using a rolling
window of 1000 episodes. The black squares and red dots represent the initial and final distributions, respectively.
only twice in layout 2 (HDDQN β = 0.7, PS & FS) 2. Interestingly
we find that for HDDQN (β = 0.5, PS) and LDDQN (DET & PS) a
larger number of runs converge upon joint-policies where RC ≈ 0.8
in layout 2. NUI-DDQNs meanwhile perform consistently when
receiving deterministic and partially stochastic rewards in both
settings, while a couple of runs faltered for fully stochastic rewards
within layout 2. It is worth noting that even for NUI-DDQN runs
with low RC , (A,A) remains a frequently observed outcome.
Deterministic Partially Stochastic Fully Stochastic
HDQN β = 0.7
HDQN β = 0.9
Table 3: Scatter plots depicting the average coordinated
rewards RC for HDDQNs with β = 0.7 and β = 0.9.
2We provide additional RC scatter plots for each evaluation setting in the Appendix.
8.5 Impact of stochastic transitions
Introducing 10 civilians to layout 2 allows us to examine the chal-
lenges faced by MA-DRL agents when attempting to overcome
relative overgeneralisation while making decisions using noisy util-
ity values backed up from stochastic follow-on transitions. In Figure
4 we compare the Q-Values from actions leading to the selection of
equipment within both 0 and 10 civilian settings from two individ-
ual NUI-DDQN runs with PS rewards. We observe that Q-Values
oscillate significantly upon introducing civilians, with Q-Values
belonging to sub-optimal equipment B pickups frequently rising
above those belonging toA. Stochastic transitions can therefore lead
to the moving target problem (Section 4.4), in this case resulting in
extended periods of miscoordination. However, by maintaining neg-
ative update intervals, NUI-DDQN can overcome miscoordination
and revert back to a policy that generates trajectories τ ∈ TA.
(a) 0 Civilians (b) 10 Civilians
Figure 4: NUI-DDQN Pickup Q-Values
8.6 Considerations regarding LDDQNs
The phase plots in Table 2 indicate that given more time an increase
in trajectories τ ∈ TA should be possible for LDDQNs. However,
while searching for an optimal set of hyperparameters we became
aware of one particular dilemma: while LDDQNs fail to converge
upon (A,A) with insufficiently decayed temperature values, rapidly
decaying temperature values leaves LDDQNs vulnerable during the
periods of miscoordination discussed in Section 8.5. We therefore
choose a patient approach, with the consequence that even after
10,000 episodes the agents have still not converged. To illustrate this
dilemma we conduct additional runs in a simplified PS reward ver-
sion of layout 1 with only 1 fire location. By varying the number of
obstacles surrounding this fire, and thereby controlling the number
of Access Points from which the agents can extinguish it, we observe
the rolling percentage of (A,A) outcomes increases significantly
faster when the number of Tt (oi ,ai ) values that need decaying
decreases. We conduct 20 runs for each access point setting:
Figure 5: Running (A,A) % by LDDQNs dependent on fire Access
Points. Agents could overlap next to the fire for 1 Access Point.
9 RELATED LITERATURE
ILs within MA-DRL systems are receiving an increasing amount of
attention within literature. However, a lot of this research focuses
on the impact of stochasticity and the amplified moving target prob-
lem caused by ERMs [9]. Zheng et al. [30] introduce a Weighted
Double-DQN that makes use of a lenient reward network alongwith
a scheduled replay strategy to improve the convergence rate within
stochastic cooperative environments. Foerster et al. [4] show that
the ERM can be stabilised by using importance sampling as a means
to identify outdated state transitions by maintaining observation
histories of the actions taken by the other agents in the system. A
further active area within MA-DRL research is centralized training
for decentralized execution. Gupta et al. [7] evaluate policy gradient,
temporal difference error, and actor critic methods on cooperative
control tasks that include discrete and continuous state and action
spaces, using a decentralized parameter sharing approach with
centralized learning. Rashid et al. [23] propose QMIX, introduc-
ing a network that estimates joint action-values as a non-linear
combination of agent-values, thereby helping agents learn optimal
joint-action values based on the additional information that cen-
tralized learning provides. Perhaps the most relevant recent work
to our research is by Wei et al. [29], who introduce Multiagent Soft
Q-Learning, an algorithm which converges towards a superior local
optima compared to MA-DDPG [13] within continuous action do-
mains suffering from relative overgeneralisation. In contrast to our
approach Multiagent Soft Q-Learning augments rewards with an
entropy term, thereby increasing the likelihood of finding multiple
modes within a continuous action space compared to the discrete
action space used in our experiments [8, 29]. However, Multiagent
Soft Q-Learning is currently a centralized approach that has only
been tested within a single state continuous game for two agents,
with the authors currently investigating the algorithm’s scalability
to ILs within sequential continuous games.
10 FUTUREWORK
1)We conducted trials using 20 sets of fixed policies trained in a
simplified layout 1, finding evidence that leader-follower dynamics
emerge during training, where one agent waits to observe the
other’s equipment choice. We assigned the policies to disjoint sets
ΠA and ΠB based on the percentage of τ ∈ TA and τ ∈ T B their
roll-outs produced. Upon subsequently running trials with each
leader-follower combination, we find half of πB followers choose
A when paired with a πA leader and vice-versa. We are currently
investigating why only some ILs develop this adaptive ability.
2) For simplicity, the actions u ∈ U returned by the oracle ϑ for
the AFG are predefined. Going foward, recent work on the topic of
theory of mind by Rabinowitz et al. [22] could pave the way for a
learned oracleϑ . The authors build a data-efficientmeta-learner that
learns models of the agents that it encounters. Through observing
trajectories τ their resulting theory of mind network architecture is
used to predict next-step actions, the consumption of objects within
the environment and the successor representation. This opens up
the possibility of applying NUI-DDQN to more complex domains
where a learning approach is required to identify actions u ∈ U .
11 CONCLUSIONS
Our empirical evaluation highlights the challenges MA-DRL agents
must overcome, to avoid converging upon sub-optimal joint policies
when making decisions using noisy approximated utility estimates
backed-up from stochastic follow-on state-transitions and rewards.
To summarize our contributions:
1)We presented the Apprentice Firemen Game (AFG), which is a
new and challenging environment that simultaneously confronts
learners with four pathologies: relative overgeneralisation, stochas-
ticity, the moving target problem, and alter exploration problem.
2)We evaluate hysteretic [18] and lenient [19] learners on the AFG.
While both approaches can overcome the pathologies in simpler
settings, they fail when required to independently make irrevocable
decisions in seclusion determining an episode’s outcome.
3) Motivated by this we designed a new algorithm NUI-DDQN
that is based on negative update intervals. Our algorithm identifies
and discards episodes that end in miscoordination. In doing so,
it reduces the noise introduced by the large punishments that re-
sult from miscoordination. We show that NUI-DDQN consistently
converges towards the optimal joint-policy within each setting.
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A APPENDICES
A.1 Hyperparameters
Table 4 lists the hyperparameters used for our empirical evaluation. To reduce the time required to evaluate LDDQN we apply python’s
xxhash to masked observations (i.e., removing civilians).
Component Hyperparameter Range of values
DDQN Base
Learning rate α 0.0001
Discount rate γ 0.95
Target network sync. steps 5000
ERM Size 250’000
ϵ -Greedy Exploration
Initial ϵ value 1.0
ϵ Decay factor 0.999
Minimum ϵ Value 0.05
Leniency
MaxTemperature 1.0
Leniency Modification Coefficient K 1.0
TDS Exponent ρ -0.1
TDS Exponent Decay Rate d 0.95
Initial Max Temperature Value ν 1.0
Max Temperature Decay Coefficient µ 0.9998
Action Selection Exponent 0.25
Hashing xxhash
NUI-DDQN ERMu Capacity 100 Episodes
Decay threshold 50 Episodes
rminu decay rate 0.995
Table 4: Hyper-parameters
A.2 Learning Best Response Policies
Table 5 provides additional RC scatter plots for each evaluation setting. Each marker within the scatter plots represents the RC for an
individual run. To provide further clarity we sort the runs by RC . We observe that for the majority of settings higher RC values are achieved
by agents in layout 1. Interestingly only HDDQN (β = 0.5, PS Rewards) and LDDQN (DET & PS Rewards) achieved higher RC values in
layout 2. NUI-DDQNs meanwhile perform consistently when receiving deterministic and PS rewards, while a couple of runs faltered for FS
rewards within layout 2. It is worth noting that even for NUI-DDQN runs with low RC , (A,A) remains a frequently observed outcome:
HDQN (β = 0.5) HDQN (β = 0.7) HDQN (β = 0.9) LDDQN NUI-DDQN
DET
PS
FS
Table 5: Scatter plots illustrating the average coordinated reward RC for each training run. The x-axis is sorted by RC values.
A.3 LDDQN Variable Access Points Experiments: Layouts & Phase Plots
Figure 6 illustrates the AFG layouts used for the evaluations discussed in Section 8.6. We also provide the resulting phase plot for each layout.
(a) 1 Access Point (b) 2 Access Points (c) 3 Access Points (d) 4 Access Points
(e) 1 Access Point (f) 2 Access Points (g) 3 Access Points (h) 4 Access Points
Figure 6: Phase plots illustrate delayed convergence of LDDQNs as a result
of increasing the number of possible state-action pairs.
